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Abstract
Dreyfus’s work is widely known for its critique of artificial intelligence and still stands as an example of how to do excel-
lent philosophical work that is at the same time relevant to contemporary technological and scientific developments. But for 
philosophers of technology, especially for those sympathetic to using Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein as sources 
of inspiration, it has much more to offer. This paper outlines Dreyfus’s account of skillful coping and critically evaluates its 
potential for thinking about technology. First, it is argued that his account of skillful coping can be developed into a general 
view about handling technology which gives due attention to know-how/implicit knowledge and embodiment. Then a number 
of outstanding challenges are identified that are difficult to cope with if one remains entirely within the world of Dreyfus’s 
writings. They concern (1) questions regarding other conceptualizations of technology and human–technology relations, 
(2) issues concerning how to conceptualize the social and the relation between skill, meaning, and practices, and (3) the 
question about the ethical and political implications of his view, including how virtue and skill are related. Acknowledging 
some known discussions about Dreyfus’s work, but also drawing on other material and on the author’s previous writings, 
the paper suggests that to address these challenges and develop the account of skillful coping into a wider scoped, Dreyfus-
inspired philosophy of technology, it could take more distance from Heidegger’s conceptions of technology and benefit from 
(more) engagement with work in postphenomenology (Ihde), pragmatism (Dewey), the later Wittgenstein, and virtue ethics.
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1 Introduction
For philosophers of technology, Dreyfus’s work is an attrac-
tive and outstanding example of how one can combine philo-
sophical thinking with a focus on specific technologies such 
as artificial intelligence (AI), and indeed how one can do 
excellent philosophy by thinking about technology. Com-
pared to the often shallow contemporary debates about AI, 
robotics, or transhumanism, for example, Dreyfus’s think-
ing is a relief. His philosophical arguments against the idea 
that AI can give us a human-like general intelligence are 
still highly relevant today, when absurd Platonic–Cartesian 
ideas such as mind uploading or projects trying to artificially 
recreate the human brain are gaining more traction than they 
deserve.
But there is more to Dreyfus’s work than thinking about 
AI, and there is much more to be gained from it for thinking 
about technology, especially for those philosophers sympa-
thetic to using Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein. 
This paper focuses on Dreyfus’s account of skillful coping 
and critically evaluates its potential for thinking about tech-
nologies today. After sketching a brief working account of 
skillful coping and exploring what it means for thinking 
about technology, a number of challenges are identified and 
some avenues to cope with these challenges are opened up—
partly by drawing on Dreyfus and partly by going against or 
beyond Dreyfus.
In particular, the paper identifies problems related to 
(1) Dreyfus’s selection of tool use as the only way to con-
ceptualize technology (and what Ihde calls the ‘embodi-
ment’ relation as the only relevant human–technology rela-
tion), together with the unfortunate repetition of the (later) 
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Heidegger’s inconsistencies and bias regarding contempo-
rary technologies; (2) his underdeveloped conceptualization 
of the social and of the relations between skill, meaning, 
and practice; and (3) the question regarding the ethical and 
political implications of his view, including the question how 
skill and virtue are related. In the course of the paper, there 
will be references to some known debates about Dreyfus’s 
approach, which are often related to its Heideggerian dimen-
sion, such as his Heideggerian interpretation of ground and 
his conceptualization of the social in terms of ‘das Man’ 
(translated by Dreyfus as ‘the Anyone’). But the paper will 
also introduce other material to the discussion about Drey-
fus’s work, such as Ihde and Dewey.
This will lead to opening up some avenues that are not 
(fully) present in Dreyfus’s own writings. In response to the 
problems identified, the paper proposes some ways in which 
a Dreyfus-inspired phenomenology of technology use and 
skill can be constructed and elaborated, but also revised, to 
address or avoid the problems previously indicated. Concep-
tual tools offered include philosophical schools and tradi-
tions Dreyfus sympathized with, but—focusing mainly on 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty—never (fully) used: postphe-
nomenology, Dewey, the later Wittgenstein, and the tradition 
of virtue ethics—the latter interpreted in a way that replaces 
the Platonic and Aristotelian obsession with theory with the 
love of practical wisdom and know-how and an emphasis on 
the exercise of skill. In the course of the paper, some of these 
suggestions and new directions are supported by referring 
to the author’s own work on skill and technology, which is 
inspired by Dreyfus’s view but also critical of it.
In the conclusion, the suggestions and directions offered 
in the course of the paper are drawn together and presented 
as elements for a Dreyfus-inspired (but perhaps not Drey-
fusian) research program in philosophy of technology. It is 
also stressed that the general direction Dreyfus took in his 
thinking on skill is not only important for philosophy of 
technology, but also stands as one of the conceptual building 
blocks all philosophers have at their disposal today to cope 
with a ghost that continues to haunt both philosophy and AI: 
the crazy idea that knowledge and thinking can be entirely 
formalized and divorced from lived experience and active 
coping in the world.
2  Dreyfus’s account of skillful coping 
and its implications for thinking 
about technology
2.1  Skillful coping
Dreyfus’s “skillful coping” view is based on his reading of 
the early Heidegger of Being and Time (1927), and has later 
found expression in the account of skill development, which 
he worked out with his brother Stuart Dreyfus (1980a), and 
in subsequent papers—some of which are bundled in the 
book Skillful Coping (2014)—that further elaborated this 
account and defended it against some objections. The main 
idea is that in practical activity and skillful coping, we do 
not rely on rules or mental representations, at least when 
we gain a sufficiently high degree of expertise and mastery.
In Being and Time (1927), Heidegger already made a dis-
tinction between two modes of experiencing a tool: when 
we use a tool, the tool withdraws, we do not notice it. It 
is ready-to-hand. Under other circumstances, for instance 
when something goes wrong, it might become present-at-
hand. But the “default” mode, we may say, is ready-to-hand. 
For example, when I use my computer to write this paper, I 
do not notice the computer; but when the operating system 
crashes, the technology becomes present-at-hand. Moreo-
ver, in our skillful coping, we do not usually need mental 
representations. In Phenomenology of Perception (1962), 
Merleau-Ponty already emphasized embodiment and what 
Dreyfus interprets as a critique of mental representation 
(Dreyfus 2002a). He explains that Merleau-Ponty’s terms 
‘the intentional arc’ and ‘getting a maximal grip’ imply that 
skill, as a tight connection between the agent and the world, 
is not stored in the form of representations in the mind, but 
instead as an embodied tendency to respond (Dreyfus 2002a, 
367); we are already set to respond, so to speak (373). Influ-
enced by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus, in turn, 
argued that our knowledge of handling things involves a 
know-how that is not explicit. We are absorbed in what we 
do, perhaps even in a state of “flow”, and we respond to the 
situation: ‘According to Merleau-Ponty, in absorbed, skill-
ful coping, I don’t need a mental representation of my goal. 
Rather, acting is experienced as a steady flow of skillful 
activity in response to one’s sense of the situation.’ (Dreyfus 
2002a, 378).
Against representationalism and Cartesianism in philos-
ophy of mind and action, Dreyfus argued that the phenom-
enology of, and knowledge involved in, practical activity 
and skill acquisition is not based on rules or mental repre-
sentations, but involves a coping that, especially when one 
is an expert, is based on implicit know-how and intuition. 
Our activity may be goal directed, but we do not think 
about the goal. Deliberation only comes in when coping is 
blocked (Dreyfus 2002a, 381), or indeed when we learn a 
new skill. We need rules when we are novices, but experts 
can do without them: rules are for beginners (Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus 1980a). As we move through stages of skill 
development, we rely on concrete experience rather than 
abstract principles. In the paper written with his brother 
Stuart they give the examples of language learning, chess 
playing, and flying an airplane, which entail perfor-
mances and responses without the application of rules or 
principles: ‘The expert pilot, having finally reached this 
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non-analytical stage of performance, responds intuitively 
and appropriately to his current situation.’ (Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus 1980, 12). Moreover, experts can have the experi-
ence that they are intensely absorbed in what they do. Here 
there is no longer self-monitoring at all:
‘masterful performance only takes place when the 
expert, who no longer needs principles, can cease to 
pay conscious attention to his performance and can let 
all the mental energy previously used in monitoring his 
performance go into producing almost instantaneously 
the appropriate perspective and its associated action.’ 
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1980, 14).
Other terms that qualify this experience are ‘holistic’ and 
‘integrated’. Elsewhere Dreyfus argued that bodily skills 
such as swimming requires a kind of unification and inte-
gration, and cannot be reduced to rules and a sequences of 
movements learned by beginners:
‘Even though bodily skills, for example, are sometimes 
learned by following rules which dictate a sequence 
of simple movements, when the performer becomes 
proficient the simple movements are left behind and a 
single unified, flexible, purposive pattern of behavior 
is all that remains. It makes no sense to attempt to 
capture a skill by using a representation of the original 
elements used by beginners, since these elements are 
not integrated into the final skill.’ (Dreyfus 1980, 9).
In contrast to computers, which need to recognize an 
object to manipulate it, Dreyfus argued, humans do it in a 
more gestalt-like manner and instead can ‘manipulate an 
object in order to recognize it’—in other words, they cope 
with the object (Dreyfus 1967, 21).
Against McDowell, Dreyfus argued that experience is not 
inherently conceptual and that we have to overcome the myth 
of the mental (Dreyfus 2005). While it is plausible that, as 
Rietveld has argued, both McDowell and Dreyfus share the 
view that our engagements with the world are situated and 
are each in their own way committed to phenomenology—
a view McDowell reached through Wittgenstein (Rietveld 
2010, 185); Dreyfus mainly through Heidegger—Dreyfus 
did not share the former’s strong emphasis on the rational 
and conceptual. Perception is not conceptual “all the way 
out”, as McDowell agued; instead, Dreyfus focused on non-
conceptual embodied coping (Dreyfus 2005, 47). Against 
cognitivism and against representing things from ‘a detached 
theoretical perspective’ (49), he argued that our everyday 
coping does not require our minds to impose meaning onto 
the world: ‘We need to consider the possibility that embod-
ied beings like us take as input energy from the physical 
universe and process it in such a way as to open them to a 
world organized in terms of their needs, interests, and bodily 
capacities without their minds needing to impose a meaning 
on a meaningless Given.’ (Dreyfus 2005, 49). Instead, in our 
everyday coping, the world is already meaningful for us.
Moreover, whereas McDowell interprets Aristotle’s 
account of practical wisdom (phronesis) in terms of respond-
ing to reasons, Dreyfus, using Heidegger, argued that prac-
tical wisdom is more like seeing what to do in a particular 
situation; it is about being ‘responsive to the specific situa-
tion’ (Dreyfus 2005, 51). Or more precisely: both thinkers 
share the interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of practical 
wisdom in terms of responding to specific situations (Riet-
veld 2010, 189), but they have a different view of the role 
of reasons and concepts in this responding. According to 
McDowell, we respond to reasons and rationality ‘perme-
ates’ even unreflective action (McDowell 2007, 368) and 
concepts are ‘operative’ in unreflective action (372); they 
show themselves in the activity. It is rationality in action (see 
also Rietveld 2010, 193). According to Dreyfus, by contrast, 
reasons are ‘retroactive rationalizations’ (Dreyfus 2005, 
51) and unreflective action is not about rationality. Dreyfus 
repeated that when we learn a skill, we may use rules as 
a kind of aid first, but like the training wheels of children 
who learn to ride a bicycle, when we become experts we 
can leave them out and we switch to ‘a more involved and 
situated way of coping.’ (52).
Dreyfus’s point was not that mental representation, goal 
directedness, reasons, etc. play no role at all in human expe-
rience; the point was that they do not usually play a role 
when we decide as experts; they may play a role at earlier 
stages (Dreyfus 2002b, 413). He thus stressed that some cen-
tral cases of intelligent behavior—indeed most of our eve-
ryday coping—do not require mental representations (414). 
He rejected the view that we can only act if we have reasons 
to do so; reasons play no role and rather get in the way. 
Instead we have to sharpen our ability to make refined dis-
criminations (Dreyfus 2005, 52). And of course a game has 
rules, but these rules are not stored in the mind or not even 
followed; instead, the expert copes and in her coping she is 
sensitive to the rules of the game (53). Everyday coping is 
intentional, but not conceptual. We respond to what Gibson 
called ‘affordances’, which happens without thinking at all 
(56). For example, doors afford going in and out, but we do 
not have to think about them—let alone calculate. When we 
learned a skill, we masterfully respond to specific situations. 
This gives us a familiarity with the world and openness to 
the world, which is not a totality of objects or of states of 
affairs. Instead we know how, and our skill opens a world. 
Our conceptual capacities grow ‘out of our nonconceptual 
ones’ (61).
In ‘The Return of the Myth of the Mental’ (Dreyfus 
2007a), Dreyfus continued his arguments against McDow-
ell, this time against the claim that in mature human 
beings, embodied coping is permeated with mindedness. 
Dreyfus stressed again the non-conceptual and non-mental 
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content of skillful coping and performing. We can moni-
tor our performances while performing, but this actually 
degrades the performance itself, especially since it dis-
rupts the mindless absorbed coping. Of course we can step 
back and reflect, but also that kind of conceptual intention-
ality is based on a ground-floor of motor intentionality, 
and there is still involved coping going on in the back-
ground. Luckily we are only ‘part-time rational animals’ 
(Dreyfus 2007a, 354); we can exercise our freedom as 
humans not so much by thinking rationally, but rather by 
opening ourselves ‘to being bound’—entering our involved 
coping (355). In this coping there is no thinking subject 
(358); rather, the world may afford or solicit:
‘According to Merleau-Ponty, at the most basic level 
of being in the world, what does the grasping is not 
the mind but the body with its nonconceptual coping 
skills, and what is grasped are not unified, proposi-
tional structures that one can observe and entertain in 
thought, but more or less indeterminate solicitations 
to act.’ (Dreyfus 2007a, 359).
To use one of Dreyfus’s examples: when we take a 
doorknob to open the door, we do not think about this 
affordance or solicitation. We respond and do all this with-
out thinking. Again, we can step back, but only against 
a pervasive background (363). Yet like in his previous 
paper on the topic, Dreyfus acknowledges that there is 
still an outstanding issue: we still want to know how the 
conceptual world is related to, or emerges from, the non-
conceptual world (364). (I will return to this issue.)
Moreover, against Searle, Dreyfus argued that social 
meaning and norms are not representational (Dreyfus 
1999) and do not require intentional action. According 
to Dreyfus, our experience of our everyday involvement 
conflicts with the logic of constitution and reconstruction 
proposed by Searle (Dreyfus 2001a, 181). The problem 
is not that analysts construct a rational account; we can 
do that. But it is wrong to suppose that we give mean-
ing to artefacts. According to Dreyfus, following Hei-
degger and other existential phenomenologists, meaning 
must not be brought into a meaningless universe; there 
is already a meaningful world (Dreyfus 2001a, 186). We 
are ‘from the start socialized into a world in which we 
cope with equipment’ (187). For example, to use money 
(Searle’s paradigmatic example), there is no need to think 
“this piece of paper counts as money”; we just use it and 
already see it as valuable if we grew up with it (189). 
There is already a meaningful world. There is already a 
cultural style, which we already pick up as a baby. There is 
already something binding on us, and we learn it without 
having to be conscious about the rules (195–196). Else-
where Dreyfus wrote that there is a background to which 
we respond: a background of practices, which does not 
consist of representations at all (Dreyfus 1980b, 9). (I will 
soon say more about this.)
2.2  Technology
Whether or not Dreyfus’s model of skill acquisition is a 
sound interpretation of Heidegger (for a discussion see 
Breivik 2007), it is an attractive model for understanding 
the everyday use and handling of technologies. Technology 
can be a tool we use, or (as we can add using postphenom-
enology—see the next section) it can be a medium through 
which we handle objects. In both cases, following Dreyfus 
we can say that skillful coping is involved—at least when 
we are expert users. There is no need to think about the 
technology; if we are experts there is even no need to think at 
all. We respond skillfully to the situation. Through technol-
ogy the world offers affordances and solicitations, without 
any need for representation by means of concepts. Many 
examples Dreyfus uses are technological, such as using a 
doorknob or driving a car: the expert driver does not need 
to think about rules on how to shift the gears; if the driver is 
sufficiently skilled, there is a bodily response appropriate to 
the situation. Thus, apart from everything else it may be (e.g. 
a significant contribution to epistemology, philosophy of 
mind, etc.), Dreyfus’s account of skillful coping is to be seen 
as a contribution to thinking about technology, to the extent 
that it enables us to say more about the kind of knowledge 
and experience involved in the use of everyday technologies 
such as hammers, cars, and doorknobs. It seems especially 
suitable to think about the handling of tools and equipment.
Sometimes Dreyfus explicitly addressed the question 
how we use tools. Drawing on Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, 
and Polanyi, he argued that how we use a tool differs from 
explicit experience and representational knowledge of an 
object. Taking up Merleau-Ponty’s example of the blind 
man’s stick, he writes:
‘A blind man who runs his hand along the stick he uses 
to grope his way will be aware of its objective charac-
teristics. When he is using it, however, he is not aware 
of its objective traits nor of the pressure in the palm of 
his hand. Rather, the stick has become, like his body, 
a transparent access to objects.’ (Dreyfus 1967, 27).
According to Dreyfus, this use has nothing to do with 
making calculations or with following rules or principles. 
It is an embodied kind of coping, a learning of skill: I first 
happen to touch something and then I repeat it, correct it, 
and so on. I consciously intervene to improve my perfor-
mance. But there is not first a knowledge of rules. Whereas 
the skilled performance may be described (from the outside, 
by science—for instance to build a robot) in terms of rules, 
‘these rules need in no way be involved in producing the 
performance.’ (Dreyfus 1967, 29). Hence—and luckily, we 
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may add—we can dwell in the world without having to for-
malize everything (31).
Does this mean that experts use no rules at all? I propose 
to distinguish between a ‘strong view’ and a ‘weak view’. 
According to the strong view, experts qua experts use no 
rules at all when they do what they are good at. Perhaps they 
use rules when they learn something new, but normally they 
do not need rules. According to the weaker view, experts use 
both rules and implicit knowledge, depending on the situa-
tion. Dreyfus seems to have held the strong view. For the use 
of technologies, it means that expert users of technology use 
it without rules and that everyday coping with and through 
technology happens without the use of concepts.
This strong view also implies that even the attribution of 
situation-specific aspects (in and by thinking) is excluded. In 
this response to McDowell (2007b), who, as we have seen, 
emphasizes the role of concepts and rationality even in 
unreflective action, Dreyfus also uses the example of using 
tools—now taking up Heidegger’s example of the hammer. 
Dreyfus argues that we do not even need a situation-specific 
concept:
‘Indeed, in our everyday coping, which he (Heidegger) 
calls ‘‘pressing into possibilities”, we don’t deal with 
objects with general properties like weight, nor with 
situation-specific aspects like too heavy. Rather, when 
everything is going well and we are absorbed in our 
coping, the equipment we are using “withdraws” 
(where, as we shall see, this does not mean becomes 
implicit). Then there is no place for a demonstrative 
concept pointing out our equipment as anything. We 
do not attribute a general property or even a situation-
specific aspect to it; we just cope.’ (Dreyfus 2007b, 
371–372).
Thus, according to Dreyfus, our everyday coping is not 
permeated by conceptuality at all. When we look at the phe-
nomenology of tool use, we usually see absorbed coping. In 
absorbed coping, when performance is at its peak, there is no 
monitoring going on; there is ‘flow’ (Dreyfus 2007b, 373). 
He uses again the example of a tool: ‘I don’t see the door-
knob as a doorknob when I’m absorbed in using it’ (375). 
There is a direct response to the situation, no concept or 
thinking. Conceptual mindedness, Dreyfus suggests, is only 
possible against the background of non-conceptual, absorbed 
coping (376–377).
These examples show that technology, in the form of 
tools or equipment, is important for Dreyfus; it is part of 
our (life) world. The already-meaningful world is a world 
in which we cope with equipment: we are socialized into a 
world ‘in which we cope with equipment’ (Dreyfus 2001a, 
187). In this sense, Dreyfus already has a philosophy of 
technology, or rather this work, the philosophy of skilled 
coping, is entangled with the philosophy of technology. For 
thinking about technologies today, his view has great poten-
tial. It seems suitable to be connected to other approaches 
in contemporary philosophy of technology such as postphe-
nomenology (see the next section) that also emphasizes how 
technology is part of the lifeworld.
However, if we want to develop his account of skilled 
coping into a wider scoped philosophy of technology, we 
need more reflection on technology. Not all technology is 
‘tool’ or ‘equipment’, or is something we handle and which 
disappears from view in our use and handling; there are 
more phenomena and experiences we can associate with 
technology. And, related: it is striking that Dreyfus’s exam-
ples of everyday artefacts—at least in his work on skilled 
coping—are all old technologies; what does his account 
mean for contemporary technologies and media such as 
the internet and smartphones? Surprisingly, Dreyfus was 
far more pessimistic about contemporary technologies than 
one would expect from his account of skillful coping. To put 
it somewhat simplistically: he did not have a problem with 
hammers, but he did have a problem with the internet. Can 
this discrimination be justified, or is it a bias—one not dis-
similar to the bias Heidegger had against modern technolo-
gies? And can it be justified on the basis of Dreyfus’s own 
theory of skillful coping?
3  Problems with Dreyfus’s conceptions 
of technology
If we want to make Dreyfus’s account of skill fruitful for 
philosophy of technology, we encounter a number of prob-
lems that are related to the limitations of Dreyfus’s Heideg-
gerian conceptions of technology.
Like in Heidegger texts, there are roughly two ways in 
which technology appears in Dreyfus’s work. The first one is 
technology as a tool, used in everyday coping. This meaning 
is based on the early Heidegger—Being and Time (1927). 
The second one is technology in its modern and contempo-
rary forms, such as the internet. Technology is then seen as 
a treat to meaning and skilled engagement. Here one could 
see the influence of the later Heidegger, who embraced craft 
work but argued that modern technology is enframing and 
constitutes a danger (Heidegger 1977). Both conceptualiza-
tions of technology can be criticized, have been criticized 
(for instance in postphenomenology), and must be criticized.
The first meaning of technology (technology as tool) 
makes sense, but is limited to one human–technology rela-
tion. Of course we often relate to technology as a tool, and 
it is the case that in our use of the tool, the tool usually 
becomes invisible. But as Ihde has shown (Ihde 1990), there 
are more human–technology relations. Dreyfus focuses on 
what Ihde calls embodiment: a relation in which the technol-
ogy withdraws in use. But technology can also appear, for 
 AI & SOCIETY
1 3
example, as reality to be interpreted or “read” (hermeneutic 
relation) or as quasi-other (alterity relation). Phenomeno-
logically speaking, a thermometer is not so much a tool as 
a feature of the world we perceive. And if we encounter a 
humanoid robot, we do not always relate to it as a tool, but 
often the robot is interacted with as if it was a human other. 
When it comes to his work on skill, Dreyfus unnecessar-
ily limits his discussion of technology to tools. It would be 
interesting to discuss the role of skills and embodied cop-
ing in, for instance, the “reading” of technologies and in 
our encounters with machines. Here postphenomenological 
analysis is more sensitive to the various ways in which we 
experience technologies, whereas Dreyfus has more to say 
on the skill dimension. A combination of both approaches 
seems promising. For example, if it is the case that many 
technologies ‘mediate’ our experience and actions (Verbeek 
2005 and subsequent work), then using Dreyfus enables us 
to argue that they do this by re-shaping our skilled engage-
ment with the world and with others.
The second meaning of technology appears in Dreyfus’s 
work on the internet (Dreyfus 2001b). Here contemporary 
technology is seen as alienating and meaningless, in contrast 
to craftwork (again referring to the use of tools). Accord-
ing to Dreyfus, ‘distance-apprenticeship is an oxymoron’ 
(Dreyfus 2001a, 67). Moreover, Dreyfus assumes that when 
we ‘enter cyberspace’ we leave behind our ‘vulnerable, 
embodied selves’ and avoid risk as disembodied web surf-
ers, remote from the real (6).
Dreyfus has rightly raised issues concerning distance, 
embodiment, and meaning. It is important to evaluate uses 
of contemporary technologies in these terms. But there are 
at least the following problems with this analysis.
First, as Verbeek and others have argued, Heidegger’s 
conception of modern technology is biased and conserva-
tive (Verbeek 2005). It is not clear why modern technology 
would be necessarily more alienating than ancient technolo-
gies. Dreyfus seems to adopt this view. In my book Envi-
ronmental Skill (Coeckelbergh 2015) I have argued that the 
internet is not necessarily alienating. Technology might 
sometimes lead to more engagement with the world, for 
instance when it attends us to features of our environment we 
may not have noticed. For this purpose it is also necessary 
to describe and reflect on the phenomenology of technolo-
gies as opposed to ‘modern technology’ as Heidegger did 
(see also again Verbeek 2005). Second, to see technology 
as meaningless, or as leading to less meaningful lives (or 
even nihilism), contrasts with Dreyfus’s (and Heidegger’s) 
own view that the world is always already meaningful and 
that we use technology as embodied beings. This leads us, 
third, to the questions regarding embodiment. While Dreyfus 
is right to expose the problematic recurrence of Platonic 
dream of leaving the body behind (and correctly argues that 
Nietzsche would reject transhumanism since his vision of 
transcendence implied affirming, not denying our bodily and 
mortal nature), it is not clear why our use of the internet, 
or for that matter all contemporary digital or information 
technology, would be disembodied use. Dreyfus seemed to 
have confused the Platonic and Cartesian visions of some 
net enthusiasts with the phenomenology of the lifeworld. 
As I have argued against Dreyfus in Human Being @ Risk 
(Coeckelbergh 2013a), when we are online or in virtual 
worlds we are still embodied and our so-called “online” 
actions and thinking is still embodied: ‘When we are online, 
we don’t leave our body at home.’ (Coeckelbergh 2013a, 
130). Use of these technologies does not close off possi-
bilities for skilled engagement (Coeckelbergh 2013a, 132). 
Elsewhere, I have also argued, against Dreyfus, that when 
we use the internet, we are actively related to our environ-
ment as embodied beings, and information technology does 
involve skills (Coeckelbergh 2011a, 152). In other words, it 
is also a form of skilled coping. And, in principle, it could 
also be a site for the acquisition of new skills and the learn-
ing of mastery. It is true that, as Dreyfus argued, for masters 
to respond immediately to present situations in a masterful 
way, they must have had experience of embodied successes 
and failures (Dreyfus 2001a, b, 67). But use of the inter-
net, including distance learning, is also a kind of embodied 
learning—albeit (it must be admitted) of a different kind.
Dreyfus may have contributed to dispel the myth of 
the mental; he still seemed to have believed in what we 
could call the myth of the virtual (or the myth of the real 
as opposed to the virtual): the belief that somehow, when 
we use the internet and related contemporary information 
technologies, we are in a different reality (an online, vir-
tual world), which is disconnected with the real reality. But 
Heidegger’s and Dreyfus’s own approaches try to move 
beyond dualist frameworks, and on the basis of Dreyfus’s 
own account of skillful coping, one could claim that in 
these uses of contemporary technologies, the technology 
also often withdraws, and that embodied coping is going 
on, mediated by the new technologies. There is no outside 
to being-in-the-world and existence; we remain earthly and 
situated beings. There is one lifeworld (Coeckelbergh 2011a, 
153). If there is alienation, it cannot be defined in this way. 
If there is alienation at all, it needs to be conceptualized as a 
problem of a particular use and relation, rather than as some-
thing linked to the technology as such. There is a problem 
with regard to distance and telepresence, but it should not 
be conceptualized in terms of a total absence of embodi-
ment. At most, it is a different kind of embodiment. There 
might be a problem with regard to meaning, but it cannot be 
the total loss of meaning, since if that use is a skillful cop-
ing it has meaning, and in the spirit of Dreyfus, Heidegger, 
and the later Wittgenstein, we can say that use takes place 
against the background of a meaningful whole. It may be 
the case that the processing of date itself is meaningless; but 
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phenomenologically there is no “in itself”; our experience 
and our engagement with computers our phones and our 
coping with data never is without meaning, and makes sense 
against a wider background of meaning.
This takes us to Dreyfus’s view of ‘the background’, 
which I shall further discuss in the next section.
4  Problems with Dreyfus’s (under‑)
conceptualization of the social
A related but different outstanding problem raised by Drey-
fus’s account of skillful coping is how skillful coping is 
related to meanings not limited to a particular skilled per-
formance, meanings that have to do with the relevant prac-
tice, and more generally the social. Skillful coping does not 
happen in a social vacuum, but is always already linked to 
larger practices and to a wider social background. Although 
Dreyfus acknowledges this, the account of skillful coping 
itself is not very helpful for conceptualizing it. If we want an 
approach to philosophy of technology that says more about 
technology than what happens at the level of individual cop-
ing, and that is still inspired by Dreyfus, then his underde-
veloped dimension of Dreyfus’s work needs to be exposed, 
discussed, and repaired.
Partly Dreyfus’s problem here is also a problem for phe-
nomenology. One recurring problem with all phenomeno-
logical approaches—including postphenomenology—is a 
tendency to limit phenomenological analysis to individual 
subjects and their relation to the world. This is also applica-
ble to other phenomenological approaches in philosophy of 
technology. For example, in Ihde (1990) and Verbeek (2005), 
the social and the cultural is of course acknowledged, but 
there is a focus on an “I” that relates to “world”, mediated 
by technologies. The root of this problem lies in the classic 
phenomenological tradition (Husserl and Heidegger), or at 
least in individualistic readings of it. From the perspective 
of other approaches in philosophy of technology such as 
critical theory and (I will add) pragmatism, but also from 
approaches in the social sciences (social studies of science 
and technology, for instance), it must be asked if Dreyfus 
sufficiently conceptualized the social and took it seriously. 
For philosophy of technology, this is an important criticism 
to discuss, since, as social studies of science and technology 
approaches have always emphasized, technology is embed-
ded in a social context and cannot be appropriately studied 
without taking into consideration the social dimension.
Consider Dreyfus’s example of driving a car. The account 
of skillful coping is very good in describing the operation 
of the car in the sense of changing gears, braking, steer-
ing—and indeed the coordination of all these operations. 
When one is an expert driver, the skills involved no longer 
require instruction or rules; they are embodied and intuitive. 
But driving expertise is not only about the operations as 
such; it also consists of participating in traffic. Traffic is a 
social phenomenon and hence driving, in the wider sense, 
is a social practice. To be skilled in driving means not only 
to be able to operate the machine but also to respond to 
situations in traffic—including its morally relevant features 
(Coeckelbergh 2016). But describing this requires a phe-
nomenology that is not only about how I related to “world”, 
but also about others. It requires a more social and relational 
phenomenology.
Let me first explore how this link to the social may be 
conceptualized from a Dreyfusian (that is, mainly Heideg-
gerian) perspective—before suggesting some alternatives 
that go beyond Dreyfus and take inspiration from Wittgen-
stein and Dewey. Like Heidegger, Dreyfus does not address 
the social as his primary focus. But, like Heidegger, that 
does not mean that he does not mention it or that we cannot 
(re)construct some conception of the social based on this 
writings. A good place to start is Dreyfus’s references to 
practices and to the ‘background’. Then I will turn to his 
use of the Heideggerian concept of ‘das Man’ (the Anyone).
4.1  Dreyfus on the (social?) background
The question regarding the background arises from the (tran-
scendental) question about what must be presupposed for 
a particular practical experience and skillful coping. For 
example, driving is only possible, and makes sense, against 
a background of a shared practice and shared norms and 
beliefs about what counts as good behavior. Driving is also 
related to other practices, such as (getting to) work and shop-
ping. Ultimately, driving is also part of an entire culture and 
way of doing, which I would call, with Wittgenstein, a form 
of life. (See below.) Yet “norms” and “beliefs” may already 
be a bridge too far for Dreyfus, who sees background as 
something that cannot be made explicit at all. Why?
According to Dreyfus, understanding must not be seen as 
a merely epistemological or theoretical problem. Of course 
we interpret and explicate, but the basis is practical under-
standing: everyday coping. Practical understanding must be 
viewed in a holistic way. This approach is what Dreyfus 
calls practical holism. He uses one of his favorite activities 
to illustrate what this means:
‘Practical understanding is holistic in an entirely dif-
ferent way from theoretical understanding. Although 
practical understanding—everyday coping with 
things and people—involves explicit beliefs and 
hypotheses, these can only be meaningful in spe-
cific contexts and against a background of shared 
practices. And just as we can learn to swim without 
consciously or unconsciously acquiring a theory of 
swimming, we acquire these social background prac-
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tices by being brought up in them, not by forming 
beliefs and learning rules.’ (Dreyfus 1980b, 7).
Here Dreyfus seems to acknowledge the social and the 
cultural. Based on Dreyfus, we could see the social in 
terms of (the totality of) shared practices, which form the 
background of everyday coping and beliefs, and which 
‘make us who we are’ (Dreyfus 1980b, 10). The social 
and the culture are thus embodied in our practices. This 
is also the case for scientific practices, which are only 
possible against background practices (16). However, 
Dreyfus refuses to define those background practices in 
terms of rules. In contrast to what Quine and Davidson 
supposed, for Dreyfus this cultural background cannot be 
made explicit and is not “in our minds” in the form of 
beliefs or background assumptions which could, in theory, 
be made explicit:
‘Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein sug-
gest that this inherited background of practices can-
not be spelled out in a theory because (1) the back-
ground is so pervasive that we cannot make it an 
object of analysis, and (2) the practices involve skill.’ 
(Dreyfus 1980b, 7).
What makes up the background is not beliefs, but 
‘habits and customs, embodied in the sort of subtle skills 
which we exhibit in our everyday interaction with things 
and people.’ (Dreyfus 1980b, 8). These cannot be reduced 
to propositional knowledge or rules. We respond to what 
situations require.
Increasingly, Dreyfus speaks of ‘the background’ rather 
than a background of shared practices. This use of the term 
as a noun in subject position is influenced by Searle, who 
speaks of ‘Background’ (Andler 2000). But, considered 
together with his position saying we cannot spell it out, 
this renders the background somewhat mysterious. Drey-
fus argues that the background is ‘hidden and holistic’ 
(Dreyfus 2012). For Dreyfus, influenced by Heidegger 
and Merleau-Ponty, we cannot describe the background, 
since when the world functions as background it ‘has’ to 
withdraw to do its job. It enables other things to show 
up (Dreyfus 2012). This is, according to Dreyfus, how 
the phenomenology of skilled coping works. Whereas for 
Searle the background is a set of mental capacities that 
makes possible representation, for Dreyfus meaning is 
already there. As said, in his view there is no need to bring 
it in via intentional acts. The world is already meaningful 
and the body also confers meaning. Following Heidegger, 
Dreyfus holds that—as Andler put it—‘the background 
is the condition of possibility for there to be anything at 
all of any significance to a being.’ (Andler 2000). In this 
sense, it is like Wittgenstein’s ‘form of life’. (I will say 
more below.) And following Merleau-Ponty, the body—as 
involved in the learning of skill and in coping—is also 
a seat of meaning and a concrete incorporation of the 
background.
Dreyfus is right to point to the background as a seat of 
meaning that is already there, and which usually does not 
need to be made explicit to function. But based on this analy-
sis of background, it is not so clear how the social comes in, 
and if the social as background must always remain entirely 
inexplicit. Does Dreyfus really mean that the background 
cannot even partly be made explicit in terms of rules or 
norms? Is the idea of a social science, which arguably has 
this project of explicitation at its very core, entirely mis-
taken? Is it senseless to speak of social rules or norms, for 
example, as social scientists do? And are philosophers who 
do so entirely misguided? It is not clear why Dreyfus takes 
on board Wittgenstein’s anti-mentalist epistemology and 
philosophy of mind, but does not seriously engage with 
Wittgenstein’s ideas about games and rules—ideas which 
influenced social scientists. (I will say more about a Witt-
gensteinian route below.) Dreyfus seems to miss an oppor-
tunity here to bring in these aspects of the social. For think-
ing about technology, we seem to be stuck with an account 
of skillful coping that is holistic and related to ‘the back-
ground’, but that background cannot be further made explicit 
at all and is bound to remain mysterious.
An interesting exception occurs when Dreyfus does speak 
of norms in his comment on style in his response to Searle, 
already mentioned before. He suggests that there are already 
social norms, there is already something binding on us, and 
we learn that from early ages on—without having to rely on 
explicit rules. This makes sense and opens up the possibility 
of a kind of middle position, which recognizes that there are 
rules, norms, etc. that have some normative power over us, 
but at the same time acknowledges that we do not (always?) 
learn them in an explicit way and that we do not need them 
in an explicit and formalized form in order to cope. But this 
thought is not made explicit, let alone elaborated. Other-
wise, we must conclude that Dreyfus simply held on to the 
more extreme position that the background cannot be made 
explicit at all.
To conclude: the social and cultural can be connected to 
Dreyfus’s thinking about background, but this connection 
is not further theorized or developed. There is, however, 
one way in which he theorized the social explicitly: a very 
Heideggerian way, to which we now turn.
4.2  Dreyfus on ‘das Man’ (the ‘Anyone’)
Dreyfus does say something about the social in his analysis 
of the early Heidegger. In a very interesting article on “the” 
world versus “my” world (Dreyfus 1975), Dreyfus argued 
that Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein was meant to overcome 
the dilemma of having to choose between prioritizing a 
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transcendental subject and prioritizing a social world. The 
everyday world is already public; there are already goals 
and equipment available in society, there are already ‘roles’ 
(Dreyfus 1975, 121–122). This thought makes a promising 
opening to a more social analysis. But then it turns out that 
Dreyfus restricts the social to a very specific conceptualiza-
tion of it in the early Heidegger: he points to Heidegger’s 
“das Man” (he translates it as the ‘Anyone’). We do what 
“one” (Dreyfus: “anyone”) does. This threatens authentic-
ity. But it is not just negative. Explaining a hammer means 
to show what “one” does with it (124). In Wittgensteinian 
terms, there is already agreement in form of life (125). Hei-
degger, however, stressed the contrast the ‘Anyone’ with 
authenticity. We lose ourselves. Dreyfus is maybe more 
optimistic and argues that we can still give individual style 
to the modes provided by the ‘Anyone’ (129). But, neverthe-
less, we are constituted by the ‘Anyone’:
‘Dasein, which as Being-in-the-world is always a way 
of acting, can and must give its individual style to 
the modes of behavior provided by the Anyone. Thus 
Dasein is both constituted by the Anyone in that all 
significance is a social achievement, and yet self-con-
stituting by taking over significances from the Anyone 
to define itself or give itself meaning. With this analy-
sis of the parasitical relation of the individual to the 
social world, Heidegger gives an account of the rela-
tion of the personal to the public which (dis)solves the 
Husserlian problems arising from the priority of my 
world to the world.’ (Dreyfus 1975, 129).
This could be seen as pointing to a kind of (Heideg-
gerian) social philosophy. Heidegger can be interpreted as 
arguing that we already find ourselves in a social world, and 
that we are always socially constituted. And it is interest-
ing that Dreyfus says something about the relation between 
Dasein and Anyone, which could be seen as asking a cen-
tral problem of social philosophy, but then formulated in a 
Heideggerian way. However, first, even within a Heideg-
gerian framework it can and has been objected that Dreyfus 
leaves out what Heidegger calls Mitsein. Olafson has argued, 
against Dreyfus, that he gives a far too large role to ‘Das 
Man’, which is only a deformation of our social being (Mit-
sein) (Olafson 2008). Carman, in turn, has accused Olafson 
of an over-individuated notion of Dasein (Carman 2008). 
Whatever the best interpretation of Heidegger may be, it 
turns out that Dreyfus (like Heidegger) has again said too 
little about the social, and has left too much room for inter-
pretation. His suggestion that human beings depend on the 
social world is important but underdeveloped. Second, the 
social is mainly seen as a given, and as one monolithic kind 
of thing. The rules or the antagonistic tendencies and vari-
ations within the social are not visible, except in the form 
of style. But this thought is not elaborated, and the Anyone 
itself remains one undifferentiated “block” or “box”. Drey-
fus’s thoughts here are too vulnerable to the objection that 
in this view there is one ‘Anyone’, which seems not up to 
change or remains black boxed. Again, this is unhelpful if 
we want an approach to thinking about technology that takes 
seriously the social embeddedness of technology.
To remedy this, one could resort to Marx or Hegel, who 
analyzed the social in terms of struggle; this may help to 
open the black box, so to speak. Or one could go directly 
to contemporary social sciences, which have more to say 
on style and the social, and which have also a lot to say on 
technology and the social [social studies of science and tech-
nology (STS), see below]. But as already suggested, there is 
a thinker closer to Dreyfus who also may be of help to say 
more about the social: Wittgenstein.
4.3  Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s post-Cartesian, anti-mentalist view in On 
Certainty (1969) and his rejection of his earlier Tractatus 
view that the world is a collection of fact, is in line with 
Dreyfus’s view, and supports his arguments against classic 
AI and his focus on how we cope with everyday problems. 
The later Wittgenstein understood knowledge not in terms 
of static and inner mental states or objective facts, but sug-
gested a more practical, pragmatic, process-oriented, tacit, 
and embodied conception of knowledge. Whether in scien-
tific research or in everyday life, our doubts rest on a basis 
of things that are not doubted, things that are accepted and 
presupposed. This approach is interesting for philosophers 
of technology as it may help us to discuss the issue of trust 
in technology, and supports a view of technology as a skilled 
and embodied practice and technique that crucially involves 
implicit knowledge (Coeckelbergh and Funk 2018). But we 
can also use Wittgenstein for the purpose of developing a 
view of the relation between a specific practical activity (or 
coping) and the wider, perhaps implicit social background. 
Dreyfus has not done this. Although he sometimes referred 
to Wittgenstein, he did not really use him to further elabo-
rate the holistic relation between everyday coping and the 
background. But we can. Let me explore some possibilities.
One way to start such a project is to draw on scholarship 
about Dreyfus that makes connections to Wittgenstein. For 
instance, Rietveld’s work on the differences between Drey-
fus and McDowell (Rietveld 2010) at least suggests that it 
can be useful to discuss interpretations of Wittgenstein in 
order to further elaborate a Dreyfusian approach. The same 
can be said about McManus’s comparison of Wittgenstein-
ian and Heideggerian ideas when discussing the concept of 
“background” in Dreyfus (McManus 2007). These critical 
discussions could be used as a starting point to bring more 
Wittgenstein into Dreyfus.
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Another way is to draw directly on Wittgenstein, as I have 
done in my recent work on technology inspired by Witt-
genstein (Coeckelbergh 2017a, b; Coeckelbergh and Funk 
2018) and in line with some suggestions in Winner (1986). 
Based on the Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 
1953/2009), I have argued for a holistic and transcenden-
tal approach to technology which sees technological arti-
fact, in their use and in our performances, as embedded 
in what Wittgenstein calls ‘games’ and ‘form of life’. The 
meanings in and of the particular use and performance are 
related to our activities, games, and form of life, which are 
also social and cultural, and which must be presupposed 
for the particular use and activity to make sense. This is a 
“background”, if you wish, but one that is more practical 
and less mysterious than Dreyfus’s. It is transcendental in 
the sense that it is a condition of possibility for technol-
ogy uses and performances, but it is not transcendental in 
a Kantian (abstract categories) or Heideggerian (a mysteri-
ous ontology of being) way. Instead, the view I proposed 
connects a particular use and performance (and hence the 
skill and know-how related to it) to a wider background 
of games and forms of life which already contain practi-
cal know-how. Moreover, this know-how is not necessarily 
implicit. It contains a lot of implicit knowledge, for sure, but 
at least part of it can be made explicit in terms of rules. This 
understanding of the social renders it possible for the social 
sciences to say something meaningful about the social and 
our social practices. But more importantly for the purpose 
of using Dreyfus’s account of skillful coping: it presents a 
more elaborated and arguably more balanced theory of the 
relation between skillful coping and its social background, 
which can at least partly be made explicit. Usually we do 
not think about the rules of our social games. Usually we do 
not make explicit our form of life. And maybe we can never 
make it fully explicit. Maybe not everything can be captured 
in rules. But surely it makes sense to sometimes formalize 
for practical purposes, that is, as a tool. (See also my use of 
Dewey below.) Furthermore, this view also acknowledges 
the normative dimension of the background—even if these 
norms may not always be visible or even if they can only be 
partly explicitated. Finally, with the concept of games we 
could also add that the background is not entirely given: we 
can also change it. We can change our games, and partly that 
can happen by changing the rules. But it can also happen 
differently. Technology, for instance, can be a game changer. 
It can disrupt and transform our background understand-
ings and practices. However, I share Dreyfus’s Heideggerian 
intuitions in so far as I believe that such changes are small 
and slow, similar to the changes in river beds—to use a Witt-
gensteinian metaphor (Coeckelbergh 2017b).
Maybe this approach also helps us to relate the concep-
tual to the non-conceptual, the challenge Dreyfus formulated 
(Dreyfus 2007a): if we see the conceptual, logic, reasons, 
etc. not as things that are “out there” in the world (as 
McDowell and Dreyfus seem to assume) but as something 
that only “lives” embodied in performance and a use, that 
only exists in our engagement with the world—in particu-
lar, our use of words and a performance with words, which 
itself is, like all performances, related and made possible 
by an implicit background of practices—then that seems 
to me at least a preliminary answer to Dreyfus’s question. 
The conceptual does not have an existence outside our uses 
and performances, and the use of concepts itself depends on 
embodiment and on an often inexplicit background: back-
ground knowledge, experience, and practices, that are always 
already social. This answer is in the spirit of Dreyfus, but—
influenced by Wittgenstein—gives more importance to the 
concept of use, acknowledges a role for the conceptual, and 
attends to use of language, which is often neglected in con-
temporary philosophy of technology (Coeckelbergh 2017c) 
and indeed in Dreyfus’s account of skilled coping.
Another route, which is also not necessarily distant from 
Wittgenstein, is STS and, earlier, sociology of knowledge, 
which usually sees knowledge as socially constructed. In the 
1990s, Harry Collins already criticized Dreyfus for not tak-
ing on board Wittgenstein’s notion of form of life and, more 
generally, for not seeing that the structure of knowledge is to 
be found in the social collectivity (Collins 1992). He writes:
‘For sociologists of scientific knowledge, most of 
whom think of themselves as jumping off from Witt-
genstein’s later philosophy, it is surprising that a phi-
losopher who leans so heavily on Wittgenstein should 
even have a concept of a knowledge domain apart from 
a form-of-life.’ (Collins 1992, 727).
There is domain knowledge, but this knowledge has a 
history—a social history in which things could have been 
different. This form of life shapes my usage. For instance, 
the English language or arithmetic can be seen as domains 
of knowledge, but they also kind of compel me to speak in 
certain ways. But at the same time that language is made 
in society. Collins thinks that we have more control over 
it than Dreyfus suggests. According to him, Dreyfus failed 
to distinguish between individual knowledge and collective 
knowledge and focused only on individual understanding 
(Collins 2013). Taking up the example of car driving again: 
Dreyfus talks about how we learn to drive in the sense of 
operating the car, but this leaves out the knowledge we need 
about traffic. This is Collins’ take:
‘Dreyfus has no concept of collective understand-
ing that is separate from the concept of individual 
understanding; this is why he makes no clear distinc-
tion between expert car driving (gear changing etc. 
which requires only the context of the machine and 
its relation- ship to the road to be internalised) and 
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expert car driving in traffic, which requires national 
driving conventions to be understood and updated 
through immersion in the collectivity. Gear chang-
ing, like Dreyfus’s iconic example of an expertise, 
that of the chess grandmaster, does not depend on 
collective tacit knowledge, whereas driving in traffic, 
and most other expertises, does.’ (Collins 2013, 411).
While I disagree with Collins that it is so easy to dis-
tinguish between the two kinds of knowledge, or indeed 
that one should make this distinction between individual 
and collective knowledge (I already mentioned Dreyfus’s 
interpretation of Heidegger that tries to go beyond this 
dichotomy and with my interpretation of Wittgenstein I 
show how use and the social are entangled), if the point is 
that driving is also about collective knowledge then this 
makes sense and helpfully brings in a social perspective. 
For thinking about technology, it means that technologies 
need to be understood not only in terms of “micro”-skill-
ful coping; that skillful coping needs to be related to a 
“macro” wider social background knowledge. One could 
also draw on work in contemporary STS (Wiebe Bijker and 
others) that shows how the design of technologies is the 
outcome of a social process, to support this point.
More generally, on the one hand, we can learn from 
the social sciences that there is something like collective-
social knowledge, that the background can at least partly 
be made explicit and is at least partly something which we 
can influence. ‘Das Man’ is not simply given. Influenced 
by Heidegger, Dreyfus makes the background more myste-
rious and untouchable than it is. On the other hand, we can 
learn from Dreyfus that the social cannot be made entirely 
explicit in terms of rules and beliefs, and that there are 
limits to the extent to which we can control it.
Another relevant objection to Dreyfus, which also links 
to STS and the social sciences, has been made by Selinger 
and Crease (2003). Here the target is Dreyfus’s account of 
expertise. While the authors praise Dreyfus for bringing in 
a first person perspective to studying expertise (rather than 
a third person perspective, as the social sciences usually 
do), and for calling attention to the relation between exper-
tise and the body, they complain that his account is not 
sufficiently sensitive to the cultural embeddedness of the 
expert, including prejudices, ideologies, and hidden agen-
das the expert may start from. Experts are not embodied 
and situated subjects, as Dreyfus shows us; they are also 
people that are culturally and socially embedded, and since 
that gives them prejudices, agendas, and so on, we should 
not naively trust them. Society might even be endangered 
by experts—an issue that cannot arise in Dreyfus’s account 
(Selinger and Crease 2003, 262–263). In particular, Drey-
fus’s point that experts might not be able to proposition-
ally justify decisions (270) seems dangerous—how can 
we trust them, and what if they assume power on the basis 
of intuitions?
The assumption made by the authors that trust necessarily 
relies on explicit knowledge and the suggestion that Drey-
fus’s model of skill acquisition necessarily leaves out the 
role of the coach are problematic. Trust does not require that 
everything is made explicit; on the contrary, otherwise there 
is no need for trust. Trust is not necessarily the outcome of 
a rational process but, according to a ‘social–phenomeno-
logical’ view, is already embedded in the social and in rela-
tions (Coeckelbergh 2011b). I also do not see why Dreyfus’s 
model of learning excludes the possibility of coaching. For 
example, a coach can be helpful for beginners, and even for 
experts, since a coach does not necessarily only give rules 
and instructions; she might also encourage a trial and error 
kind of process of the kind that Dreyfus would approve of. 
And Selinger and Crease speak about a very specific kind of 
expert than the everyday expert of Dreyfus: not the expert 
driver or swimmer but, for instance, an expert who is asked 
about health or climate change, who is socially recognized 
as “expert” in the sense of a doctor or scientist, for example, 
and has a specific role to inform policy as an “authority”, 
who has an “audience”, and so on. But their point about 
embeddedness is important since it points again to a lacuna 
with regard to the social dimension of Dreyfus’s model. 
Focused on embodied coping, the account of skilled cop-
ing and expertise seems less sensitive to social, cultural, 
and political context than it could be. This includes the 
point suggested by the authors that experts are and should 
be vulnerable in the sense that they can be challenged with 
regard to their expertise and that they can be asked to give 
reasons—even if not everything can be explained and some-
times experts just have to say (not “admit”, this sounds too 
negative) that they rely on their experience and intuitions. 
But it makes sense to say that the social and the political also 
includes giving reasons and deliberation. This is a lacuna in 
Dreyfus’s work. And perhaps the more fundamental problem 
is that the entire social and political playing field, in which 
experts are situated and which plays a role in what they say 
and become, remains out of sight.
How can this be conceptualized? Next to STS and Witt-
genstein, pragmatism is another source which can help us to 
conceptualize the social dimension of skillful coping, and 
which has a lot more to say on deliberation and public dis-
cussion than can be done within a Heideggerian framework.
4.4  Dewey
A thinker who is curiously absent in most discussions by and 
about Dreyfus is Dewey. (An exception is a Dreyfus paper on 
ethical expertise—see Sect. 5.2). This is curious since there 
are at least the following points of connection. First, like 
Dreyfus and Wittgenstein, Dewey was skeptical about the 
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language of the “mental” and sees mind as embodied. But 
he also understood it as emerging from the interaction in a 
social context. In Experience and Nature (Dewey 1929) he 
sees knowledge as ‘a mode of interaction’ (435) and argues 
that meaning is not a ‘psychic existence’ (179). Dreyfus, 
focused on the handling of tools, ignores this more social-
interactive view. But if we see technology as an instrument 
of social cooperation, as I proposed in my interpretation of 
Dewey’s view of language (Coeckelbergh 2017a, 33–37), 
then this puts tool use as skillful coping in a more social 
context. Moreover, whereas Dreyfus seems to put language 
in a separate category (the conceptual, the symbolical, etc.) 
divorced from embodied coping, for Dewey language is 
both embodied and social. It is about organized interaction 
with other living creatures (258). Second, Dreyfus could 
have used Dewey’s conception of habit. In Human Nature 
and Conduct (1922), Dewey argues that we know how by 
means of our habits (Dewey 1922, 177). This idea seems to 
fit Dreyfus’s account, and could help to understand our use 
of technology from a more social angle. Dreyfus talks about 
habit, but does not use Dewey to elaborate this social aspect 
of skillful coping. That coping and those skills can be under-
stood as being part of habitual and shared ways of doing, 
and our tools become tools in the context of social groups 
(186). Third, Dewey’s work also seems particularly relevant 
when it comes to conceptualize public discussions about 
technology. In Dreyfus’s work, the public dimension is men-
tioned but not theorized. Dewey could be used to elaborate 
this aspect of the social in a non-Hegelian way. But Dreyfus 
rejects this route. Here a significant barrier to using Dewey 
is that whereas Dewey stresses deliberation to solve social 
problems, for Dreyfus a lot is going on without deliberation. 
Moreover, Dreyfus seems to divorce mind and knowledge 
from the social. In his response to Collins (Dreyfus 1992, 
724), Dreyfus argues that not all intelligence is social; this 
goes against the pragmatist view that intelligence is social 
and, again, is about solving social problems. (More below.) 
Finally, one could ask if Dreyfus’s account of skilled cop-
ing is sufficiently appreciative of the social-linguistic and 
communicative dimension of coping. In my interpretation 
of Dewey, language must be seen as a social tool (Coeck-
elbergh 2017a, 35). Perhaps language could be integrated 
in a Dreyfusian–Wittgensteinian view by saying that next 
to the handling of things, there is also skillful coping with 
words, and both kinds of skillful coping are always embed-
ded in a social–practical context in which there is inexplicit 
knowledge but also language and language games, consti-
tuting a form of life which is given and shapes our concrete 
coping-performances. And here, too, one could add that in 
the use of words, in coping using words, that language with-
draws, is not always visible. Indeed, it is usually so invisible 
that Dreyfus managed to leave it out of his account of skill-
ful coping. But this “default” invisibility does not justify 
excluding it from a theory about the kind of knowledge and 
experience involved in skilled coping.
But there are also possibilities next to using Dewey, that 
are certainly not far away at all from the thinking of Hei-
degger and Merleau-Ponty, but that are, nevertheless, more 
appreciative of the social aspect of skill than Dreyfus was. 
For example, Borgmann, a philosopher of technology who 
in his praise of skilled activity is very close to Dreyfus, 
manages to connect skilled activity to the social in a very 
straightforward, less Heideggerian or mysterious way. He 
writes:
‘Physical engagement is not simply physical contact, 
but the experience of the world through the manifold 
sensibility of the body. Skill is intensive and refined 
world engagement. Skill, in turn, is bound up with 
social engagement. It molds the person and gives the 
person character.’ (Borgmann 1984, p. 42).
Borgmann (1984) stresses that when we are engaged in 
skilled activity, we do not only engage with things but also 
with others, for example, when keeping a stove going cent-
ers the family. A similar view can be found in Crawford’s 
analysis of craftsmanship, which is about working together 
and sharing a concept of good (Crawford 2009, 181). One 
could also argue that skilled activity helps us to shape our 
character. This takes us to the questions regarding virtue, 
and more generally the ethical and political implications of 
Dreyfus’s position.
5  Problems with the ethical and political 
implications and the question 
regarding virtue
What are the ethical and political implications of Dreyfus’s 
view of skilled coping? While his account is mainly descrip-
tive and aimed at understanding the kind of knowledge 
involved in skilled coping, it has normative implications. 
The problem is again that it is not entirely clear what these 
implications are based on Dreyfus’s own writings; but these 
implications need and deserve to be further articulated and 
developed, also with a view to arrive at a better thinking 
about technology.
Like Reynolds (2006) I believe that if we look at his 
account of skill acquisition, Dreyfus’s view is one in which a 
kind of ethical comportment is more important than sophisti-
cated reasoning: moral maturity ‘is primarily about an ethi-
cal comportment to situations in the world rather than about 
coming to have more sophisticated cognitions and judgments 
about principles and rule-following’ (Reynolds 2006, 545). 
Ethics seems to require the development of a practical wis-
dom which can respond intuitively and appropriately to spe-
cific situations. This sounds like virtue ethics. Dreyfus might 
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have been aware of this connection: when I had a chance to 
talk to him in Berkeley, years ago, he suggested to me that 
virtue ethics may be a good way forward when it comes to 
elaborating the ethical implications of his work. But more 
work is needed on this: how, exactly, does his account of 
skillful coping relate to virtue ethics? It seems to me that his 
account lends support to virtue ethics, albeit a virtue ethics 
of a particular kind: one that does not necessarily involve 
reasoning and judgment, but rather a knowing-how to best 
respond to the world and to others in particular situations. 
Let me develop this thought about a Dreyfusian virtue eth-
ics by engaging with some of the literature on virtue and 
skill. I will end by raising the question regarding political 
implications.
5.1  Virtue and skill
What does it mean to say that virtue is about skill? Annas 
famously argued that virtue is like skill (Annas 1995). The 
point is that there is an analogy in structure between the two. 
Now, whether or not this is a sound interpretation of Aristo-
tle (for a discussion see Stichter 2007), this is an interesting 
view in the light of Dreyfus’s emphasis on skill. Annas’s 
claim concerns intellectual virtue; her project was to under-
stand intellectual virtue. But what if virtue tout court is like 
skill? And what if virtue is not so much about intellect at 
all? Indeed, perhaps there is more than an analogy: in the 
spirit of Dreyfus one could argue that this is still a far too 
intellectualist conception of virtue. For Annas, virtue as skill 
requires reflection (Annas 1993) and the development of an 
intellectual component (Annas 1995). For her, the stress is 
on reflection and decision: ‘The skill analogy requires that 
the agent reflect and achieve by reflection a unified grasp 
of the general principles underlying her patterns of action 
and decision.’ (Annas 1993, 67–68). But is this reflection 
and decision necessary and sufficient for virtue? Stichter 
convincingly argues they are not necessary:
‘A person’s ability to explain herself can be less than 
the person’s ability to know how to act in the situation. 
The intellectual requirements that Annas discusses are 
relevant to any social discourse we have about moral-
ity, but they are not necessary for achieving expertise.’ 
(Stichter 2007, 194).
Annas admits that many skills are not like the skills she 
describes, but then still endorses her intellectualist concep-
tion of skill, going against our intuitions and experience: 
indeed she defends an account of skill that ‘does not fit 
numerous examples of actual skills’ (Stichter 2007, 187). 
She thus perpetuates an intellectualist tradition of think-
ing about skill that started at least with Plato and Aristotle. 
It ignores recent thinking about skill including Dreyfus’s 
work—which was already available when Annas wrote. The 
point is not that I disagree with Annas’s interpretation of 
Aristotle: he may well have an intellectualist, theory-ori-
ented understanding of virtue, skill, and practical wisdom 
(phronesis); this is at least also my impression when I read 
him. As McPherson puts it: ‘Aristotle himself, it is worth 
recalling here, classified phronesis as an intellectual virtue, 
aiming at truth, rather than as a practical virtue, aiming at 
goodness.’ (McPherson 2005, 706). But if this is right, there 
is no need to follow Aristotle on this. Learning from Drey-
fus, we can do better and develop theory that is closer to 
the actual phenomena of skilled coping and their relation to 
virtue and good.
Indeed, as becomes clear on the basis of my summary 
of Dreyfus’s account, and as Stichter also shows (2007, 
192), Annas’s view goes against a Dreyfusian way of think-
ing about skill: for Dreyfus, skillful coping does not at all 
require reflection. Hence, if we use skill as a model for vir-
tue and use Dreyfus’s view of skill, then virtue would also 
be virtue without an intellectual component. It suffices that 
we know how to do good in the sense that we know how to 
do good in practice. Theoretical knowledge or reflection, 
then, are neither necessary nor sufficient for virtue, and can 
even get in the way of this virtue-as-skilled-engagement and 
virtue-as-performance. A standing back, so it seems, is then 
not required. For Annas, this would not be genuine skill. 
According to her, virtue is about having a disposition to act 
for reasons (Annas 2007). But, from a Dreyfusian point of 
view, there is no good reason why we have to follow her 
conception of virtue. Thus, let us go further than Annas, and 
argue that virtue is not only analogous to skill but entirely 
a matter of skill, but then understood as embodied coping, 
and as not needing anything else than know-how: knowing 
how to do good (in practice).
This is a conception of virtue I defended in my own think-
ing about technology, skill, and virtue. If we think about 
ethics of technology as a virtue ethics, if we define virtue in 
terms of skill, and indeed if we define technology in terms 
of skill (Coeckelbergh 2012), then we get the following con-
ception of virtue: virtue is a matter of practical wisdom, 
which implies a knowing-how and skill. Being “wise” is 
etymologically related to a “way” (Coeckelbergh 2015, 118 
footnote 2). (Here one could also consider Eastern concep-
tions of virtue, for instance in Daoism and Confucianism.) 
Influenced by Dreyfus and Dewey, I have argued that virtue 
is about knowing how to do things. Virtue is not about hav-
ing particular properties, but about practicing virtue. There 
is not first a ‘logos’ which then needs to be applied to the 
real world. Rather, virtue is about having ‘ethical know-how’ 
and doing it, practicing it (Coeckelbergh 2011a, 162). And 
if we then see technology in terms of skill, we have a view 
in which virtue, skill, and technology are integrated. There 
are no longer two sides—reason and intellect versus embod-
ied coping and material technologies—but there is only one 
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skillful coping, engagement, and practice, and virtue is all 
about the quality of that coping, engagement, and practice. 
For example, environmental virtue is not something abstract 
and external (say, a principle) that is imposed on the life-
world as it were from outside, but rather something that goes 
on in the lifeworld and that transforms it. It is about how we 
(skillfully and technologically) relate to our environment. 
Virtue is then ‘a way of doing’ and a ‘form of life’ (168). Or 
as I said it elsewhere, in the context of thinking about health 
care: good health care is ‘in the how’; it is about knowing-
how to deal with people and handle technologies (Coeckel-
bergh 2014). Of course we can reflect and deliberate. This 
may help. But if we have that kind of practical wisdom, that 
kind of know-how, there is nothing in terms of virtue that is 
wanted in addition or outside of that wisdom.
5.2  Ethical expertise: Dreyfus contra Dewey
This interpretation of virtue in terms of know-how is in line 
with Dreyfus’s own phenomenology of ethical expertise, but 
he takes distance from Dewey. In a paper with his brother 
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991) he repeats the account of skill 
acquisition, but then draws out the implications for ethi-
cal expertise. In so far as ethical comportment is a form of 
expertise, the brothers Dreyfus argue, it has the same devel-
opmental structure (236). As a child we learn moral rules, 
but rules and maxims are for beginners in moral develop-
ment. Ethical experts do it differently: ‘with enough expe-
rience, the ethical expert would learn to tell the truth or 
lie, depending upon the situation, without appeal to rules 
and maxims’ (237). Interestingly, here the Dreyfus broth-
ers do use Dewey to develop their account. They endorse 
Dewey for saying that ethical comportment is spontaneous, 
involving an immediate reaction. But then they argue that 
Dewey was wrongly focused on problem solving and ignored 
‘ongoing coping’, which is not only simple but also complex. 
According to Dreyfus, as experts we can respond to complex 
situations without deliberation (238). Against Aristotle’s 
intellectualism (or, in Dreyfus’s view: against intellectualist 
interpretations of Aristotle), the Dreyfus brothers argue that 
people should not only be praised for what they intend to do 
but also and especially for their ‘brilliant intuitive responses’ 
as experts (239). Virtue, then, is spontaneous: ‘We can only 
tell if a person is courageous, for example, by seeing his 
spontaneous response in many different situations.’ (239) 
For Dreyfus, no practical reasoning is necessary. Principles 
can even hinder good ethical responses:
‘an ethical expert when confronted with cases of “life-
boat morality” may have to fall back on ethical princi-
ples. But since principles are unable to produce expert 
behavior, it should be no surprise if falling back on 
them produces inferior responses. The resulting deci-
sions are necessarily crude since they have not been 
refined by the experience of the results of a variety 
of intuitive responses to emotion-laden situations and 
the learning that comes from subsequent satisfaction 
and regret. Therefore, in familiar but problematic situ-
ations, rather than standing back and applying abstract 
principles, the expert deliberates about the appropri-
ateness of his intuitions.’ (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991, 
241).
Against Dewey, who thinks that in difficult situations 
we need deliberation and examination, Dreyfus and Drey-
fus argue that of course experts should have a dialog about 
their responses, but there may be no final agreement; the 
experts have to appreciate each other’s decisions (242). And 
against Kohlberg and Habermas (and partly in agreement 
with Gilligan), they argue that the highest stage of moral 
development is not about detached and abstract reasoning, 
but intuitive response to the situation. They write: ‘if being 
good means being able to learn from experience and use 
what one has learned so as to respond more appropriately 
to the demands of others in the concrete situation, the high-
est form of ethical comportment consists in being able to 
stay involved and to refine one’s intuitions.’ (247). Detached 
reflection is resorted to in case of a kind of breakdown, it 
is not the rule. One could conclude that, according to the 
Dreyfus brothers, skillful coping without deliberation is the 
‘default’, at least for experts.
Dreyfus and Dewey may actually be closer than presented 
here. Both agree that the main challenge is to appropriately 
respond to situations. Both may also agree that emotions 
and intuitions play a role. Dewey also criticized abstract 
principles and detached reasoning. Principles are tools to 
cope with a situation. Dreyfus could have arrived at a less 
extreme view if he recognized that, like other tools, princi-
ples and reasoning can help us to skillfully and expertly cope 
with ethically challenging situations, especially in a social 
context. These tools may not be sufficient. And it may well 
be that before, during, and after the decision, the expert can-
not entirely render her decision process and the knowledge 
basis of this decision process transparent. But talking with 
others and the use of principles may help, like other tools 
may help. If Dreyfus would have recognized that language, 
concepts, etc. are also a kind of tools, he could have held the 
view that deliberation is perhaps not necessary, but helpful 
as one of the tools we have. He could have arrived at the 
more moderate view that moral experts at a higher stage of 
development, when faced with a problem in a social context, 
often masterly know how to combine various tools and types 
of knowledge, including intuition, emotions, principles, dis-
course, etc.—without being able to fully explain themselves 
afterwards but with being able to have a meaningful conver-
sation with others about their decision. However, perhaps the 
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final aim and the highest stage is moral wisdom and virtue 
understood as knowing-how to do good, which may also be 
reached without deliberation and conversation; they are nei-
ther sufficient nor necessary. Moreover, with Dewey we can 
add that when we seek consensus, it is impossible to reach 
a final agreement, with “final” meaning: an agreement for 
once and for all. Dreyfus could have agreed with this view. 
But with Dewey we must appreciate, more than Dreyfus did, 
the social and collective dimension of coping and indeed of 
the problems we face. There is often the practical–social 
need for collective coping to reach a temporary consensus 
among experts. Language and other tools may help with this.
5.3  If skilled engagement and craft work are 
good, what does that imply for contemporary 
technologies?
Next to implications for a conception of virtue and moral 
development, Dreyfus’s work also contains a particular 
view of the good life—especially the good life in the con-
text of modernity. Dreyfus does not only make a descrip-
tive claim about knowledge and skill; we can also discern 
in this work the normative claim that skilled engagement 
itself is something good, that particular technological prac-
tices—craft work especially—are ethically good in several 
ways, are conducive to the good life. In line with work by 
Pirsig, Sennett, Crawford, and in philosophy of technol-
ogy Borgmann (see my discussion in Coeckelbergh 2015), 
Dreyfus thought that there is something special about skilled 
engagement that makes it good in itself, and that helps us 
to cope with the nihilist tendencies in modern culture. Now 
this claim—which, by itself, has a lot to say for it—is not 
necessarily right in its evaluation of modernity and can lead 
to a conservative and pessimistic position with regard to 
new technologies. This seems the direction Dreyfus took, for 
example, in his book with Kelly (Dreyfus and Kelly 2011).
According to Dreyfus and Kelly, our modern (self-)under-
standing has left us with a meaningless world. In response 
to this nihilist condition, they argue that we must re-enchant 
the world by seeing that the gods are there (polytheism), that 
there is the sacred, and that there are still Greek-style heroes, 
for example in sport (Dreyfus and Kelly 2011, 201). But they 
also propose craftwork and its skilled activity as a response 
to alienation and nihilism. According to the authors, we can 
come to discern meanings that are already there (209) and 
may feel that there is a force outside our self (8). The crafts-
man achieves ‘intimacy’ with the material (2010), whereas 
modern technology such as GPS alienates us from our envi-
ronment. They write:
‘to lose the sensitivities—to the landmarks, street 
signs, wind direction, the height of the sun, the stars—
all the meaningful distinctions that navigation skill 
reveals. (.. .) Indeed, in an important sense this expe-
rience turns you into an automated device the GPS 
can use to arrive at its destination.’ (Dreyfus and Kelly 
2011, 215).
While I agree with the authors on the value of skilled 
activity, and even on the potentially alienating aspect of tech-
nologies such as GPS, alienation and nihilism are certainly 
not the only possibilities when it comes to contemporary 
technologies. First, the world is a lot less disenchanted than 
Dreyfus and Kelly suppose. Consider for instance how much 
wonder there is in contemporary science and technology, 
and how romanticism and technologies are still entangled 
(Coeckelbergh 2017d). More generally, it is highly doubtful 
if we find ourselves in the nihilistic situation Dreyfus and 
Kelly describe. We always find and create meaning, also in 
our daily coping with and through technologies. Second, 
even if there is still alienation due to technologies, new tech-
nologies are not only a problem; they may also be part of 
the solution. Different technologies and uses are possible. 
As postphenomenology reminds us (Ihde 1990), and as I 
have argued using Wittgenstein (Coeckelbergh 2017a, b), 
technologies are ambiguous and ‘multistable’ in the sense 
that they are always technologies-in-use: the same artifact 
has different meanings depending on use and context. This 
has implications for thinking about technology and virtue. 
In my work on skill, technology, and virtue (Coeckelbergh 
2011a, 2012, 2015), I have proposed a more constructive 
approach than Heidegger and Dreyfus: one which does not 
a priori exclude the possibility that new technologies may 
contribute to skilled activity, virtue, and good. For example, 
when it comes to wayfinding it is true that GPS may divert 
our attention from our surroundings, but perhaps some apps 
can help us to see features of the environment that we did 
not notice (yet). There may be more modes and possibili-
ties (Coeckelbergh 2015, 149) and more creative uses of the 
same device to explore different ways of wayfinding and 
walking (152).
More generally, I have argued that contemporary informa-
tion and communication technologies could, in principle, 
also help us to overcome alienation and find a better relation 
to our environment and to others. In ‘Technology as skill and 
activity’ (2012), I have argued that we can take seriously the 
problem of alienation but at the same time have a Dreyfus-
inspired (but also more social and Dewey-inspired) ethics 
of skill that is open to the possibility that new technologies 
can also help us to overcome alienation. We can use the 
concept of skill to evaluate new technologies, asking if they 
contribute to more or less skilled engagement. But there is 
no a priori answer as to which technologies are more ‘focal’ 
(to use Borgmann’s term; Borgmann 1984) or more engag-
ing and more conducive to skilled activity and craftsman-
ship—activities and modes of knowledge and interaction 
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which Dreyfus rightly valued. What matters then is not what 
technology “is” (as is sometimes suggested in Dreyfus’s late 
Heideggerian approach to new technologies), but rather what 
kind of skills–activities are promoted and supported by spe-
cific technologies, by a particular technology-in-use. What 
matters is whether or not the skills–activities lead to more 
engagement and less alienation. (Coeckelbergh 2012).
Thus, new technologies are far more ambiguous with 
regard to skilled engagement than Dreyfus suggests. Con-
sider also the work of Shannon Vallor, who has argued that 
while contemporary ICTs can lead to ‘moral deskilling’ 
there may be also potential for ‘upskilling’ (Vallor 2015). 
Recently, she has called for a technomoral virtue ethic (Val-
lor 2016). These interpretations of the relation(s) between 
technology, skill, and virtue suggest that it is possible to talk 
about virtue and skill in a way that is critical of contempo-
rary technologies, but also takes a more constructive and 
hopeful approach: perhaps there often is, but there does not 
need to be, an opposition between the cultivation of virtue 
and the development of advanced technologies.
Consider again the use of electronic technologies in 
health care. In ‘E-care as craftsmanship’ (2013b) I have 
argued that while under modern conditions and with the use 
of tele-care there are real dangers with regard to the erosion 
of craftsmanship, the use of new technology is not neces-
sarily jeopardizing skillful and careful engagement with 
patients and quality care. Whether such an engagement is 
possible depends on whether in a specific practice and given 
a specific technology e-care workers can develop the know-
how and skill to engage more intensely with those under 
their care, and to cooperate with their co-workers. What 
matters is how care workers work and care, when using 
and working with new technology—and with each another. 
Hence, craftsmanship in “e-care” is possible, for example, 
when tele-care technologies are used as a complement rather 
than a replacement of care workers, and when criteria and 
conditions for craftsmanship are fulfilled (Coeckelbergh 
2013b). Another way of putting this is, again, to say that 
good health care is not about the technologies as such; good 
health care is in the “how” (Coeckelbergh 2014). The chal-
lenge is to design and use technologies in such a way that 
more engaged and care-full ways of doing and knowing-how 
are promoted.
5.4  The social and political dimension of virtue 
and craftsmanship: Dewey and MacIntyre
As I already suggested, craftsmanship also has a social 
dimension (Coeckelbergh 2012). It is not only a kind of 
technical skill; it is also about doing things together, shar-
ing good, and indeed the skill to work and relate to others. 
But this social dimension is not always presents in views of 
craftsmanship, skill, and virtue. Often the emphasis is on the 
individual or personal level. This is also the case in Drey-
fus’s account of skillful coping. As I proposed, the social 
dimension could be developed by bringing in a pragmatist 
(or other) conception of habit and other concepts that help 
us to understand the social and public dimension of skilled 
engagement and virtue. Individual or personal experience 
and wisdom are always linked to collective knowledge—
explicitly and implicitly. If virtue and the highest stage of 
moral development are a matter of skillful coping, as Drey-
fus argued, then this skillful coping should not only be con-
ceptualized in terms of individual knowledge. Dewey’s prag-
matism or the social sciences could help Dreyfus-inspired 
philosophers to further work on this problem. Another inter-
esting source may be MacIntyre, who is acknowledged by 
Dreyfus but not fully used. His conception of practice as 
a social and historically situated activity that enables par-
ticipants to attain goods internal to the practice and achieve 
excellence and virtue (MacIntyre 1984) might have enabled 
Dreyfus to say more about the social dimension of skillful 
coping and virtue, in particular about the links between skill-
ful coping, virtue, and practice. It may certainly provide a 
source of inspiration to those philosophers working on virtue 
and technology who are interested in developing the social 
dimension of their work. (Note also that MacIntyre, Dewey, 
and the later Wittgenstein are in agreement when it comes 
to rejecting the fact/value distinction, which may also help 
to conceptualize a view of virtue that links it firmly to its 
social and practical contexts. However, I will not further 
elaborate this point here.)
Moreover, given the often-lacking attention for the social 
dimension of virtue in modern theories of virtue, virtue 
approaches are in danger of ignoring the political dimen-
sion—including potential political problems that are often 
ascribed to thinking in terms of skill, craft, and virtue. Since 
modern virtue ethicists tend to be focused on individual 
moral development or (more local) practices, they are often 
blind to the wider and often antagonistic social playing field, 
within which individual cultivation of character is set. Or far 
worse, they do not ask the political question at all.
This is also a problem for a Dreyfus-inspired thinking 
about technology, to the extent that it comes in the shape of 
a virtue ethics focused on individual skillful coping. Such 
a focus leaves too much room for interpretation concerning 
the political implications. Reynolds (2006) has argued that 
there is a danger that Dreyfus’s phenomenology devolves 
into a conservative communitarianism that does not recog-
nize ‘the inevitability and vitality of social conflict.’ (555). 
Whether or not this is true, it raises the issue of the political 
implications of Dreyfus’s phenomenology. Dreyfus seems 
to have inherited Heidegger’s positive valuation of the kind 
of knowledge that is involved in craft work. But did he also 
inherit Heidegger’s conservatism or worse, his Nazism? 
Does a positive valuation of craft work or a tendency 
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towards virtue ethics necessarily lead to conservatism? Is 
it communitarian, and then what kind of communitarian-
ism? Is communitarianism necessarily conservative? Or are 
there other possibilities? And is there an unbridgeable gap 
between phenomenology and critical theory, or could Drey-
fus’s phenomenology be combined with some concerns and 
methods from critical theory?
Reading Dreyfus’s work I do not see indications in the 
direction of conservatism, let alone Nazism, and I do not see 
why his thinking would necessarily lead into that direction. 
There is conservatism regarding technology, perhaps, but 
this does not necessarily imply social or political conserva-
tivism. However, these questions deserve further discussion, 
also in the light of contemporary debates about Heidegger’s 
political sympathies. Since, as I have argued, Dreyfus’s 
thinking has insufficiently engaged with the problem of the 
social, and since it has never been fully developed in terms 
of its social and political implications, it remains somewhat 
vulnerable to typical anti-Heideggerian criticisms. There-
fore, if philosophers of technology want to use Dreyfus’s 
thinking, they need to say more about the relations between 
skill and the social, and explicitly reflect on the normative 
and political directions this may take them. In the previous 
pages I have proposed some ways in which this can be done 
by staying relatively close to Dreyfus’s own sources (rather 
than resorting to critical theory, for instance). In particular, 
I have suggested that using and combining Wittgenstein and 
Dewey (and maybe also MacIntyre) has a lot of potential to 
say more about the social in relation to the phenomenology 
of skillful coping.
More generally, more work is needed to develop these 
thoughts about how Wittgenstein, Dewey, and Dreyfus can 
be combined to (re)conceptualize and discuss virtue and 
its social dimension. This project requires, among other 
things, further engagement with Wittgenstein’s work and 
its interpreters and a more elaborate discussion of both con-
vergences and tensions between these thinkers. Here I have 
limited myself to offering some signposts in this direction, 
and to exploring some potential implications for philosophy 
of technology.
6  Conclusion
For thinking about technology, Dreyfus’s account of skilled 
coping is and remains a valuable source, especially for 
those who are, like Dreyfus, interested in using Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, and the later Wittgenstein to better under-
stand the knowledge and experience involved in the use of 
tools, in skillful coping with and through technologies. How-
ever, I have also outlined and discussed some challenges 
that come with Dreyfus’s approach: problems with regard 
to his assumptions about technology, his underdeveloped 
conceptions of the social dimension of skillful coping, and 
uncertainty with regard to the ethical and political implica-
tions of this view, including questions regarding the relation 
between virtue and skill. I have indicated some potential 
avenues for addressing these problems. In general, my rec-
ommendation to those inspired by Dreyfus in philosophy 
of technology is to take more distance from the later Hei-
degger’s conception of technology and to do more with 
Wittgenstein and Dewey than Dreyfus did to deal with these 
challenges. I have indicated that there is also a lot of room 
for further development in the direction of virtue theory, for 
example by combining Dreyfus and Dewey or by engaging 
with the work of MacIntyre. Finally, so far authors working 
in the field of postphenomenology have not been very inter-
ested in Dreyfus’s work (and vice versa); perhaps since the 
former rejects the latter as too Heideggerian. This neglect is 
to be regretted since Dreyfus’s work, in particular its account 
of skillful coping, has a lot to offer to anyone interested 
in the phenomenology of technology use. By shifting the 
emphasis from the material artifact as such to its use and 
the skills and knowledge involved in that use, contempo-
rary philosophers of technology in postphenomenology and 
related approaches could work towards a more relational and 
non-dualistic thinking about the relations between humans 
and technology—an aim Ihde may sympathize with.
More generally, Dreyfus’s work constitutes a rich poten-
tial source of inspiration for philosophers of technology 
today, not only in the area of philosophy of AI but—with the 
account of skillful coping—also in other areas of thinking 
about technology. It is especially of interest to philosophers 
who aim to be sensitive to the phenomenology of living with 
technologies, to human experience with technologies. This 
attention to technology in the lifeworld also requires us to 
adopt, in contrast to Dreyfus and Heidegger, a view of new 
technologies that is more open and constructive and that 
goes beyond embodied tool use, without, however, dismiss-
ing the concerns about skill, alienation and virtue Dreyfus 
and others rightly raised. This could help philosophy of 
technology to further develop thinking about the phenom-
enological and ethical implications of AI: not in the abstract, 
but in use, as it is becoming part of our lifeworld and indeed 
of our skilled practices and our coping.
But Dreyfus’s work also remains relevant to contempo-
rary philosophy in general. Its main message is especially 
relevant and urgent when, and to the extent that, this philoso-
phy is too mesmerized by formal and theoretical knowledge 
and by abstract arguments and principles, to the neglect of 
other, less explicit types of knowledge involved our everyday 
living and coping. Together with other key twentieth-century 
philosophers (and indeed contemporary cognitive science), 
Dreyfus successfully criticized the idea that we can sepa-
rate mind and thinking from bodies and living people. If 
that were possible, we would not miss Dreyfus’s voice here 
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and now. The writings and other memory technologies we 
have would do the job of representing and preserving his 
thinking. But, as Dreyfus taught generations of philosophers 
by means of his teaching and (in my case) writings, nei-
ther thinking nor human beings can be reduced to what can 
be represented. Thinking needs to be embodied and lived. 
And, therefore—if not for other reasons—Hubert Dreyfus 
is greatly missed.
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